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COMMENT
A Rapid or Evolutionary Approach: The
EEC's Adoption of the ECU as a
Common Currency
INTRODUCTION
One of the goals of the Single European Act (SEA) was to "ensure
the convergence of economic and monetary policies" among the Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC or Community) member states.' The
reference in the SEA's preamble to the European Council's resolution in
December 1978 regarding the introduction of the European Economic
Resolution indicates that the SEA anticipates the European Currency
Unit (ECU) as part of that convergence.2
The SEA also indicates that any further development of economic
and monetary policy that necessitates institutional changes requires an
amendment to the EEC's founding treaty.3 The EEC's December 1990
conference discussed amending the Treaty of Rome for monetary union.4
A draft of the amendment should be available for signing in December
1991. Two major proposals were tabled at this conference. The EEC's
proposal, known as the Delors Report, sees a common currency for
member countries as a desirable feature of monetary union, and the pro-
posal suggests that the ECU should fulfill this role.5 In addition, the
1 The Single European Act, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 8 (1987) [hereinafter Single
European Act].
2 Resolution of the European Council of 5 December 1978 on the Establishment of the Euro-
pean Monetary System (EMS) and Related Matters, reprinted in THE ECU 49-50 [hereinafter THE
ECU].
3 Single European Act, supra note 1, at 9.
4 Wall St. J., Aug. 17, 1990, at 7.
5 See generally Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, Report on Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union in the European Community (1988) [hereinafter Delors Report].
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Delors Report views a European System of Central Banks as a require-
ment of monetary union.6 Under this proposal, adoption of the ECU by
member countries is implicitly expected.7 However, not all of the Com-
munity countries are in agreement with this proposal. Great Britain, in
particular, is opposed to this idea and has developed its own proposal.8
Britain's alternative, known as the "hard ECU" proposal, sees no need to
mandate the acceptance of the ECU as the EEC's currency.9 Rather, it
envisions issuing ECUs as a dual currency, available on demand in lieu of
the national currencies of member countries. ° Market forces, rather
than political mandates, would dictate the ECU's acceptance as a Com-
munity currency. 1 In addition, instead of creating a European System
of Central Banks to administer the ECU, the British proposal suggests
developing an alternative institution called the European Monetary Fund
that would co-exist and be jointly owned by member state central
banks.12 This seemingly radical departure from EEC policy has been
gaining support from several member countries.
13
Which proposal is better for the EEC? Section I of this comment
examines the history and use of the ECU. Section II discusses the legal
foundation and evolution of the European Monetary System (EMS) and
ECU. Section III looks at the economic theory of optimum currency
areas and examines whether the EEC is economically suited for a single
currency. Section IV discusses the private ECU, and how a change in
the official ECU could affect the private market for ECUs. Finally, Sec-
tion V examines the two proposals for the next stage of monetary union
in the EEC. As the analysis herein suggests, the EEC should adopt
Great Britain's alternative proposal for a dual currency system. It is in
line with market forces, and consequently will allow for a smoother tran-
sition both for the private sector and national monetary policies.
I. HISTORY AND USE OF THE ECU
With the formation of the EEC, 14 a common measure of value was
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 See generally Butler & Richards, The Next Stage in an Evolutionary Approach to Monetary
Union, British Invisible Exports Council, Mar. 28, 1990 [hereinafter Evolutionary Approach].
9 Id.
10 Id. at i.
11 Id. at ii.
12 Id.
13 Europe: The Union Debate, The Independent, Dec. 15, 1990, at 10.
14 The EEC was created by the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, opened
for signature Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome], which entered into force
on Mar. 1, 1958. France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg all
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needed for the community budget, settling claims and obligations, and
expressing common prices for agricultural goods.15 Consequently, the
ECU'began its life as a unit of account.
16
There were many predecessors to the ECU. The European Payment
Union set up the first unit of account in 1950.17 This unit was valued in
gold, and had the same weight in gold as the U.S. dollar."8 The unit
could be converted into national currencies based upon the member
states' fixed exchange rates under the Bretton-Woods Agreement. 19 The
degeneration of fixed exchange rates led to experimentation with many
different units of accounts within the Community.2' Most notably, in
1972 the EEC adopted the "snake". 2' The snake permitted exchange
rate fluctuations of ± 2.25% against the U.S. dollar and ±4.5% among
any two Community currencies.22 This allowed Community currencies
to float together.23 Central banks in the Community needed to take steps
to keep currency fluctuations within a narrow band.24
Following President Nixon's announcement that the dollar was no
longer convertible into gold, there was a widening of fluctuation margins
against the dollar and other European currencies.25 The oil crisis in the
1970s, along with other economic pressures, repeatedly put the snake
currencies under pressure. 26 The market exchange rates changed often,
and many of the currency participants could no longer participate in the
snake because of the need for greater independence in the area of cur-
rency management.27
ratified the Treaty. In 1973, Britain, Denmark and Ireland joined the EEC. Greece joined in 1981,
and Portugal and Spain became members in 1986.
15 THE ECU, supra note 2, at 6.
16 Id. at 5. The term "unit of account" is defined as a unit in which prices are quoted and books
are kept. See R. DORNBUSCH & S. FISCHER, MACROECONOMIcS 250 (1984).




21 The snake "combined adherence to international agreements with partial implementation of
the Werner Plan." T. HMRIs, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ECONOMICS: A MODERN INTRODUCTION
95 (1988) [hereinafter EEC ECONOMICS]. The Werner Report advocated that fixed but adjustable
parities among member currencies, and mutual monetary defense and support mechanisms, were
essential features of a monetary union of member countries. Mehmert, The European Currency Unit
- The ECU- Currency for the United States of Europe, 23 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 349, 354
(1989).
22 EEC ECONOMICS, supra note 21, at 95.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Levich, The ECU and the European Monetary System, in EUROPEAN CURRENCY UNIT 17
(R. Levigh ed. 1987).
26 EEC ECONOMICS, supra note 21, at 96.
27 Id.
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On April 21, 1975, the EEC created the European Unit of Account
(EUA).28 The EUA was made up of specific quantities of the nine mem-
ber states' currencies, and was based on the International Monetary
Fund's Special Drawing Right (SDR).29 The EUA laid the foundation
for the ECU. When the EMS was established by a European Council
Resolution on December 5, 1978,30 the resolution included a clause that
renamed the EUA the European Currency Unit.3 It is interesting to
note that since the signing of the EEC Treaty in 1957, there have been
over ten different units of account used by the EEC.32 Thus, it is difficult
for a common currency to survive in "volatile economic conditions and
divergent nationalistic goals" such as varying inflation rates and unem-
ployment rates.33
Since its inception in 1979, the composition of the ECU has only
been revised twice. The first time was in 1984, when the Greek drachma
was added to the basket.34 The second time was in September 1989,
when the Spanish peseta and the Portuguese escudo were added. 5 Revi-
sions of the ECU must be mutually accepted and do not, by themselves,
modify the value of the ECU.3 6
The European Council envisioned four uses for the ECU.37 The
ECU would be used as: first, "the denominator (numeraire) for the ex-
change rate mechanism;"3 second, "the basis for a divergence indica-
tor;"31 9 third, "the denominator for operations in both the intervention
and the credit mechanisms;"'  and fourth, "a means of settlement be-
28 THE ECU, supra note 2, at 6.
29 Id The SDR consisted of 16 currencies in a common basket and included the U.S. dollar. Id.
30 THE ECU, supra note 2, EMS Resolution at Al.1.
31 Id. at A2.1. See also Single European Act, supra note 1.
32 Levich, supra note 25, at 17.
33 Id.
34 EEC Council Regulation No. 2626/84, 27 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 247) (1984).
35 EEC Council Regulation No. 1971/89, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 189) (1989).
36 J.V. LOUIS, FROM EMS TO MONETARY UNION 20 (1990).
37 THE ECU, supra note 2, EMS Resolution at A2.2.
38 Id. at A2.2(a).
39 Id. at A2.2(b). The deviation of a currency's market rate from its central rate is measured in
terms of its weight in the ECU. These divergence thresholds are 75% of the currencies' fluctuation
rate (±2.25%) multiplied by the currencies weight in the ECU. Thus each currency has divergence
thresholds depending on that currency's weight in the ECU. If a currency deviates over its diver-
gence threshold, this creates a presumption that the country that issued the currency should correct
the divergence by either buying or selling the currency. EEC EcONOMICS, supra note 21, at 100 -
101.
40 THE ECU, supra note 2, EMS Resolution at A2.2(c). "Intervention consists of the country's
monetary authority buying or selling the foreign currency against the national currency with the aim
of influencing their own currency's exchange rate by expanding or reducing supply." Id. at 14-15.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 12:390(1991)
tween monetary authorities of the European Community."4
The ECU is a basket currency, and is defined as a fixed amount of
the national currencies of the European Community member states.42
Once the amount of each component currency in the basket is set, it can
be changed by unanimous consent of the Council of Ministers of the Eu-
ropean Community.4 3 As foreign exchange rates change, the value of the
ECU may shift along with the weight of individual currencies.' The
composition of the ECU remains unchanged despite fluctuations in com-
posite currency rates.45 Consequently, the ECU is suitable for private
markets because it can hedge or replicate fixed portfolios. 
4
Another important facet of the EMS and the ECU is the Exchange
Rate Mechanism (ERM). The ERM attempts to create convergence
among member countries' monetary policies by fixing member currency
exchange rates to fluctuate no more than ± 2.25%.%47 While member-
ship in the ERM is not mandatory, Great Britain's recent ascension to
the mechanism means that all of the currencies making up the ECU,
except the Portuguese escudo and the Greek drachma, are now part of
the ERM.48 A 6% fluctuation rate allows additional flexibility for new
members of the ERM.49 Within the ERM, each currency has a central
rate against the ECU; each central rate is fixed for each currency in the
EMS. These ECU-related central rates are used to establish a grid of
bilateral exchange rates.
Official ECUs are created through a subscription of member state
central banks to the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF). °
Central banks exchange 20% of their gold reserves and gross dollar
reserves in exchange for ECUs issued by the EMCF.1x These three
monthly exchanges are mandatory for members of the ERM.52 The in-
terest accrued on ECUs swapped is equivalent to the interest accrued on
the dollars transferred. This results in no exchange rate risk for the as-
41 Id. at A2.2(d). The ECU's use as an instrument of settlement is limited by an agreement
between the member states' central banks. J.V. Louis, supra note 36, at 22.
42 THE ECU, supra note 2, at 8.
43 Id. at 10.
44 Id. The composite currencies added together equal 100%. As a currency goes up in value,
this can lead to the ECU rising in value as well. Id. at 11.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 J.V. Louis, supra note 36, at 23.
48 Thatcher Links Pound to Europe, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 6, 1990, § 2, at 1.
49 The Spanish peseta and the British pound all have fluctuation rates of 6%. Bruce, Spanish
Wizard Bedeviling Delors, Financial Times, Oct. 12, 1990, at 2.
50 J.V. Louis, supra note 36, at 22.
51 Id.
52 Id.
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sets transferred for ECUs, and consequently, these swaps occur at par. 3
II. LEGAL FOUNDATION AND EVOLUTION OF THE EMS AND ECU
The legal foundation of the ECU and the EMS has been more polit-
ical and economic will than any set of enforceable laws. The Treaty of
Rome contains little on the subject of economic and monetary union. 4
The European Council formed the EMS in an effort to fill this void,5 and
created the EMS by resolution. 6 Resolutions are not defined in the origi-
nal Treaty of Rome, and thus the legal consequences of resolutions are
not spelled out.57 As a result, there was no requirement to join the EMS
because a resolution can not obligate member countries to do anything.
Consequently, many think the success of the EMS is due to the political
and economic will of the EEC for some type of monetary policy
convergence.58
The EMS was not legally recognized until Article 2 of the Single
European Act (SEA) came into force on July 1, 1987.51 The twelve
member states of the European Communities adopted the SEA in 1986
by way of an amendment to the original Treaty of Rome.6 By amending
the founding Treaty of the EEC, the SEA, unlike the EMS Resolutions,
is binding on community members.61 The SEA is considered to be the
most important modification of powers and processes on European inte-
gration since the Treaty of Rome.62
The adoption of the SEA was the result of a continued effort to
pursue economic and monetary union in the EEC.63 However, when the
SEA was first introduced, the member countries reacted differently to its
provisions. Germany did not want monetary union until the economic
policies of the member states were coordinated. 64 Great Britain, Den-
mark, and Greece did not want the Treaty to link the liberal internal
53 Id.
54 Harris, Legal Implications of European Monetary Union, 139 NEW L. J. 1083, 1083 (1989).
See also Evolutionary Approach, supra note 8.
55 THE ECU, EMS Resolution, supra note 2.
56 Comment, The ECU: Prospects for a Monetary Union in the European Economic Community,
21 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 273, 279 (1989) [hereinafter Prospects for a Monetary Union].




60 Single European Act, supra note 1, at 4.
61 Prospects for a Monetary Union, supra note 56, at 279.
62 Riesenfeld, The Single European Act, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 371 (1990).
63 Id. at 372.
64 Louis, Monetary Capacity in the Single European Act, 25 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 9, 14
(1988).
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market with further monetary regulation.6" President of the EEC Jac-
ques Delors, however, felt the two were explicitly linked.66 France, Italy,
Belgium, and Luxembourg wanted a new monetary chapter added to the
Treaty, while Great Britain and Germany did not.6 7
From the start, President Delors wanted to enshrine the EMS and
the ERM within the Treaty, and ensure the status and role of the Euro-
pean Fund for Monetary Cooperation.68 The European Monetary Com-
mission and Committee of Central Bank Governors thought this
approach put too much of an emphasis on monetary union.6 9 They
wanted more flexible provisions to give member countries and the EEC
leeway in the event of unexpected economic developments. 70 Thus,
rather than laying out specific provisions regarding the EMS and the
ERM, the Commission and the Central Bank Governors felt the Treaty
should contain a statement of a European Monetary Union (EMU) ob-
jective.71 In addition, they felt the Treaty should state the necessity for
the convergence of national monetary and economic policies.72
These differences resulted in a number of compromises which are
embodied in the SEA. To begin with, the preamble of the SEA is con-
crete and precise.73 It makes an explicit reference to the EMS resolution
and the 1972 conference on European Monetary Union.74 Article 18 of
the SEA amends the EEC Treaty by allowing a qualified majority to act
on a proposal concerning the internal market rather than requiring unan-
imous consent.
7 5
Subsection II of Section 2 of the SEA contains the provisions on
monetary capacity.76 Article 20 of this subsection amends the EEC
Treaty with a chapter on Economic and Monetary Policy in a new Arti-
cle 102a. It also contains the enabling clause which gives the Commu-
nity the unambiguous right to establish monetary union within the
EEC.77
The new Article 102a explicitly acknowledges the goal of economic
65 Id.
66 Id. at 15.
67 Id. at 13-15.
68 Id. at 16.
69 Id. at 17.
70 Id
71 Id. at 18.
72 Id.
73 Single European Act, supra note 1, at 2.
74 Id. at 2.
75 Id. at 8.
76 Id.
77 Id.
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and monetary policy convergence among member countries.7" Policy
convergence is not a prerequisite for development in the monetary field,
but it is, "necessary for further development of the Community."7 9
Article 102a asks member states to "take account of the experience
acquired in cooperation within the framework of the EMS and in devel-
oping the ECU," and to "respect existing powers in this field."8 0 This
statement embodies an official recognition of the EMS and the ECU.
The reference to the ECU indicates a desire for the progress of both the
private and official ECU. 1 The reference to "experience acquired" is
vague. The vagueness of the phrase allows for great future flexibility in
the monetary field. If the SEA were more explicit, this flexibility would
not exist.
The second part of Article 102a provides the legal basis for building
the EMU and ECU short of institutional developments. These institu-
tional developments are scheduled to occur in the final stages of the
EMU, and will require additional revisions of the EEC treaty. The unan-
imous consent of the European Council, member states, and their central
banks is required for any changes in EEC institutions regarding the EMS
or EMU.
2
The implications of the SEA are still debated. First, the SEA did
nothing to resolve the absence of any legal obligation to participate in the
ERM. 3 However, even though political will is the only impetus for the
ERM, it seems to be doing a good job. Great Britain's recent decision to
join the ERM in early October 199084, despite a long period during
which it refused to join, indicates that the political will for such an ar-
rangement is alive and well in Europe.
The Single European Act never referred explicitly to how the ECU
would be implemented because such a provision would have been too
broad and would not have been acceptable to the initial opponents of a
monetary chapter in the SEA. 5 The fact that it does mention the ECU
and the EMU indicates that they are among the SEA's objectives. More-
over, some feel that the adoption of the SEA will restrain the central




81 Louis, supra note 64, at 26.
82 Single European Act, supra note 1, at 9.
83 Louis, supra note 64, at 30.
84 Thatcher Links Pound to Europe, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 6, 1990, § 2, at 1.
85 Louis, supra note 64, at 25.
86 Id. at 26-27.
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monetary policies implies pooling sovereignties, which will affect a cen-
tral bank's autonomy.8" Losing control over a country's currency can
have potentially harsh effects on a country's economy. 88
President Delors felt that the SEA embodied the essential elements
of reference to the EMU, EMS, and the ECU.8 9 Delors also thought that
the SEA provided the possibility for the Community to have a say in
these elements.90 Former Prime Minister Thatcher felt it changed noth-
ing because it required additional revisions.9 1 The European Parliament
thought that the SEA imposed new obstacles to the development of the
EMS. The resolutions in the SEA were too global and did not indicate
any "necessary short term measures to strengthen the EMS."92
Others think that the mere expression of objectives within the SEA
will lead to additional progress. The SEA has not created a monetary
capacity in the EEC, but rather has confirmed a long-standing goal
within the community for European monetary union.93 The fact that the
SEA requires an additional revision of the EEC Treaty to establish the
institutional framework needed for the final stages of EMU reflects a
gradual movement toward monetary union within the EEC. Thus, the
success of the EMS in the opinion of many, including the author of this
article, has been and continues to depend on the political and economic
will behind the system rather than any set of enforceable laws. Conse-
quently, any further revisions of the Treaty of Rome regarding monetary
union should reflect this will.
III. OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREAS
Often, political will goes hand-in-hand with the proper economic
circumstances. In order to determine whether these circumstances exist,
and to determine if the EEC is ready for a transition from a system of
moderately flexible exchange rates to a common currency, it is helpful to
look at the economic theory of optimum currency areas. This theory is
utilized to determine whether a group of countries would benefit from
fixing their exchange rates in relation to one another.94 This theory is
normally applicable to fixed exchange rate agreements that can be bro-
87 Id. at 27.
88 See infra notes 94-132 and accompanying text.
89 Louis, supra note 64, at 21.
90 Id. at 22.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 23.
94 Odrodnick, Optimum Currency Areas and the International Monetary System, 44 J. INT'L
AF. 241 (1990).
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ken. This is not a feature of a common currency area. However, many of
the features of a fixed exchange rate system are similar to that of a com-
mon currency area, and thus an area that is optimal for fixed exchange
rates will be a good area for a common currency as well. Consequently,
the theory can be applied to countries contemplating currency union.
A currency area is a "domain within which exchange rates are
fixed." 95 An area that is not optimal for fixed exchange rates needs a
flexible exchange rate system.96 There are several factors that determine
whether an area is an optimal currency area. The first of these is factor
mobility.97 When factors of production, such as labor, are mobile, (i.e.
they can move easily from one region to another), fixed exchange rates
are useful. However, when they are not mobile, flexible exchange rates
are needed to restore balance of payment deficits or surpluses.9 8
Another important feature of an optimal currency area is the "open-
ness" of a country's economy. A country that has a high ratio of im-
ported goods as compared to nationally produced goods is considered to
be an open economy. 99 Open economies are generally favorable for the
establishment of a currency area.1"°
A country's "openness" can affect its monetary policy.101 Often, a
country will devalue its currency in order to encourage other countries to
purchase its goods. When a country depreciates its currency, its goods
become cheaper for other countries to purchase.10 Thus, currency de-
preciation attracts other nations to buy its goods, and discourages im-
ports because they are too costly for the depreciating country's
consumers.103 This would be undesirable for countries contemplating a
currency union, and it is something member countries are seeking to
eliminate.' 04
However, depreciation of the national currency in an open economy
will not diminish imports because the economy depends too heavily upon
95 Id. at 241.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 243.
98 Id. Country A has inflation and Country B has unemployment. If factors of production are
mobile, then they will move from Country B to Country A and restore the balance of payments in
both countries without changing exchange rates. Absent this factor mobility, Country A's currency
will appreciate while Country B's currency will not. This will lead to a decrease in demand for
Country A's goods and an increase in demand for Country B's goods, and the flexible exchange rates
have solved the balance of payments problems.





104 Europe: The Union Debate, The Independent, Dec. 15, 1990, at 10.
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imports.10 5 This ties in with the diversity and size of a nation's economy.
An economy that does not produce a diverse range of goods needs to
import many goods, and thus is most likely an open economy.10 6 Most
smaller economies are less diversified, and more open, while most larger
economies are more diversified and more likely to be closed. As a result,
small, open and non-diverse economies may be better for larger currency
areas than big, diverse, closed economies.0 7
Furthermore, inflationary preferences need to be similar in order to
create an ideal area for fixed exchange rates. In a fixed rate system,
countries' central banks lose control of their domestic monetary policy
because the setting of exchange rates has already been established.108
Consequently, in a fixed exchange rate regime, countries with higher in-
flation will export their inflation to countries with lower inflation."° In
addition, it is also helpful if countries within a currency area have similar
preferences for growth and unemployment. 011 A regional leader who is
able to set the tone for monetary policy amongst members of the cur-
rency area is important for an optimal currency area."'
Finally, countries with floating exchange rates are insulated from
external economic shocks, while countries in a fixed rate regime are able
to export their internal shocks (e.g. inflation and unemployment) to the
other countries in the regime." 2 Sometimes, one country's internal
shock is another's external shock." 3 As a result, it is better if the eco-
nomic shocks of each country are random and uncorrelated in order for a
system of fixed exchange rates to increase overall price stability."
4
In applying this theory to the EEC, it is first important to state that
the EMS is not a system of rigidly fixed rates. Rather, it is a framework
of limited flexibility. Each currency can fluctuate within its margins and
the EMS allows realignments of the participating currencies. Indeed,
from the beginning of the EMS in 1979 to 1989, there have been eleven
realignments within the ERM."5
In the area of factor mobility, the EEC has already removed tariffs
on member countries, thus creating a "free trade area" among member
105 Odrodnick, supra note 94, at 244.
106 Id. at 245.
107 Id. at 246.




112 Id. at 248.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 256.
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countries.116 The Single European Act aspires to create a common mar-
ket by removing other non-tariff barriers to goods, and by removing re-
strictions that hamper the free movement of labor and capital among
member nations.1 17 Generally, a move to a common market enhances
factor mobility and increases the desirability of fixed exchange rates.1 18
However, the Single European Act's removal of remaining trade barriers
on goods may discourage factor mobility. 119 If this decrease in factor
mobility is enough to outweigh the rise in mobility the Single European
Act seeks, then the EEC would be better off with exchange rates that
allow for some flexibility. 20
The European Community countries, for the most part, have open
economies. Six of the countries in the ERM are small, and Germany is
the only large country whose economy can be compared with the econo-
mies of the United States and Japan. 21 Due to their common market
arrangements, most of the Community's countries' economies areclosely
integrated. 2 2 Germany is the predominant economy, and would 'proba-
bly best fill the role of a leader. Although it has been a leader in deter-
mining EEC monetary policies in the past, Germany's recent
reunification may defuse its interest in taking on such a role.
Inflation rates for most EEC countries are not widely divergent, but
are far from convergent.1 23 Germany continues to carry a low inflation
rate of merely 3%.124 Great Britain's inflation rate, after hitting an
eight-year high of 10.9%,125 continues to be a problem, and is far above
the Germany rate. Inflation rates are even higher in Italy, Spain, Portu-
gal and Greece.'
26
In addition, it is still uncertain what kind of effect German reunifica-
tion will have on the deutschmark. This is important because the
deutschmark is the dominant weight in the ECU basket and problems in
the German economy can have substantial effects on the economic poli-
cies of other European nations. Indeed, Germany's deficits have been
116 Id. at 250, 251-52.
117 Id. at 251-52. See generally Single European Act, supra note 1.
118 Odrodnick, supra note 94, at 252.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 257.
122 Id.
123 Time Became Right for the ERM, Daily Telegraph, Jan. 1, 1991, at 22.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Cracks Appear in Economic Cooperation as EC Conference Nears, Reuters Report, Dec. 12,
1990.
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rising to finance the reunification. 127 This may force the German
Bundesbank to tighten monetary policy,12 boosting the deutschmark's
interest rate as well as the interest rates of other European currencies,
like the French franc, which currently pin their monetary policies to the
deutschmark. 12 9 Thus, other European currencies, through their in-
creased interest rates, will be partially financing German reunification.
130
In addition, growth rates among member countries are also still di-
vergent. Predictions are for Germany to grow at 3.25% in 1991, while
France's growth is estimated at only 2.5%, and Great Britain at a mere
0.75%, according to a recent Commission report.1 31 The report singled
out Italy and Greece for "excessive" budget deficits, and said that Great
Britain's high wage settlements were not compatible with the EEC's
ERM.
These factors make movement to a system of entirely fixed exchange
rates undesirable. Thus, "based on a theory of optimum currency area
... the EMS exchange rate arrangements of limited flexibility or realign-
able fixed margins are close to optimal for the European Community."
132
Indeed, moving to a regime of fixed exchange rates with no transition
could have disastrous effects on member countries.
IV. THE PRIVATE ECU
Private ECUs represent contracts between private individuals and
banks. 33 Private banks receive convertible currencies when they create
private ECUs.134 These banks issue a guarantee that their ECUs can be
changed into component currencies, thereby insuring the value of the
private ECU.135 The private ECU began in 1979 when a number of Bel-
gian banks opened ECU-denominated sight and time deposit accounts at
the request of a number of Community institutions. This allowed the
European Commission of the EEC to simplify its cash management.
136
Eventually banks saw the ECU as a good hedging instrument.






132 Odrodnick, supra note 94, at 258.
133 Levich, supra note 25, at 18.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 THE ECU, supra note 2, at 25.
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the official ECU, 137 the two still have a significant effect on one another.
The private ECU reflects an "open basket". An open basket denotes that
the composition of the private ECU reflects the official definition of the
ECU at a particular moment.138 A "closed basket" would maintain the
definition of the official ECU as it was on the date the contract was
made.139 In other words, if an investor buys a private ECU contract at
time A, and wants to convert it to the component currencies at time B,
then conversion will reflect the official ECU basket value at time B. Con-
sequently, the value of the private ECU is subject to the changes of the
official ECU. 140 This creates an element of risk for those using the ECU
to hedge underlying positions in component currencies, whose composi-
tion and alignment within the official ECU are subject to change.141
There are many advantages of the private ECU for individuals and
private businesses. These advantages are similar to those of the official
ECU and have encouraged the growth of the private ECU over the past
eleven years. The most often cited advantage of the private ECU is that
less exchange rate risk exists since the private ECU represents a basket of
currencies. The variability of a basket currency will be less than the
weighted sum of the variability of each currency that makes up the bas-
ket.142 In addition, the ERM keeps the fluctuations of participating cur-
rencies within narrow limits of one another.143 Consequently, exchange
rate movement between the ECU and the individual Community curren-
cies can be predicted with greater certainty than exchange rate move-
ments of Community currencies against one another. 1"
Another advantage of the private ECU is the reduction in transac-
tion costs. Any transaction with the ECU could be replicated by trans-
acting with each of the component currencies. However, with twelve
component currencies, there are many more transaction costs.
145
Furthermore, foreign exchange restrictions in member countries
that stunt the development of substantial financial products do not apply
to the private ECU. Member states have created a legal and institutional
framework to enable ECU transactions within their countries, 146 en-
137 Levich, supra note 25, at 22.
138 Id. at 18.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 13.
142 Id.
143 THE ECU, supra note 2, at 26.
144 Id. at 27.
145 Levich, The ECU. Introduction and Overview, in EUROPEAN CURRENCY UNrr 13 (R. Levich
ed. 1987).
146 THE ECU, supra note 2, at 26.
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abling banks to tailor ECU products to their customers' needs. 147 Coun-
tries treat the ECU as a foreign currency. 148 A number of countries,
most recently Germany, have relaxed their foreign exchange controls to
allow commercial banks to carry out "in their respective currencies the
converting transactions associated with ECU transactions.' 49 As a re-
sult, the ECU is subject to much less restriction, and it is easier for the
ECU to be competitive in financial markets. "By moving transactions
into the ECU market, agents may be able to trade a wider range of prod-
ucts at more favorable terms than they might in their domestic mar-
kets." 150 While this advantage may decline if member countries relax
their foreign exchange controls on domestic currencies, many of the EEC
countries have small financial markets, giving the ECU an advantage due
to economies of scale. 151
These advantages allow businesses to simplify their cash manage-
ment by replacing a multitude of European currencies with one. In
trade, exchange rate risk is reduced when importers and exporters, who
want to use a third currency for invoicing purposes, use the ECU in place
of the dollar.152 Any non-Community country that uses the ECU simpli-
fies the administrative problems and the exchange rate risk of dealing in
numerous different currencies.' 53 The ECU's ability to reduce exchange
rate risk is used by banks for their own purposes in foreign exchange
dealings.' 54 These dealings are not limited to member state banks, but
also include banks in the U.S. and the Far East.'55
In addition, the need for non-European firms to protect themselves
against fluctuations of their own currencies was met by the creation of
ECU futures and options. The ECU option has been traded on the Phila-
delphia Stock Exchange since February 1986. ECU futures have been
traded on the New York Cotton Exchange and the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange since 1986.156
147 Id. at 29.
148 Id. at 26.
149 THE ECU, supra note 2, at 26. During the first nine years of the EMS, Germany had
problems recognizing the ECU. It was classified as a unit of account and not as a currency. Under
German currency laws, the authority for operations on foreign currencies existed, but this authority
did not apply to the ECU. This changed on June 16, 1987 when the Bundesbank changed its policy
and authorized that the private ECU was to be treated like any other foreign currency. J.V. Louis,
supra note 36, at 33.
150 Levich, supra note 145, at 13.
151 Id.
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In the area of bonds, the ECU bond market has risen steadily since
1981.157 In the autumn of 1988, the United Kingdom Treasury issued
ECU Treasury bonds with a maximum six month term.15 8 The same
year, Italy issued ECU bonds, and in 1989 the French government
launched its first long-term loan in ECUs. 5 9 The Italian and Greek gov-
ernments have also issued significant amounts of ECU-denominated pa-
per in their national markets.1 60 Since 1985, the issuance of these bonds
has shifted from almost entirely public issuers, such as publicly-held cor-
porations, to almost half private issuers. 161 There has also been a shift
from private investors to institutional investors since ECU bonds were
first issued. 162 The Japanese are among the most active in the ECU bond
market, 163 and ECU denominated notes are being issued by U.S. corpo-
rations as well. 64
At the end of 1987, the total issuance of ECUs exceeded 28 million,
while lending at the end of the first half of 1987 was 60 million. 165 Some
European financial institutions have issued ECU travelers cheques, as
well as ECU credit cards.1 66 Thus, the Community's efforts to increase
the use of the private ECU both within the EEC and internationally ap-
pear successful.
The European Community has taken an active role in fostering the
development of the private ECU. During the 1984 and 1989 revisions of
the ECU, the European Commission was concerned about the effect a
revision would have on private investors with contracts signed before the
date of the revision. 167 In order to avoid market fragmentation, the Eu-
ropean Commission made sure that the value of the private ECU corre-
sponded to that of the official ECU regardless of the date of the
contract. 168
In addition, the Community is aware that a change in the official
ECU basket will have unavoidable effects on the private market, even
157 Id. at 32.
158 J.V. Louis, supra note 36, at 31.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 THE ECU, supra note 2, at 32-33.
162 Id. at 33.
163 Prospects for a Monetary Union, supra note 56, at 278.
164 Id.
165 J.V. Louis, supra note 36, at 31.
166 Levich, New Markets and Uses for the ECU, in EUROPEAN CURRENCY UNIT 127 (R. Levich
ed. 1987).
167 THE ECU, supra note 2, at 30.
168 Id.
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though the private and official ECUs are not officially linked.1 6 9 The
Community wants to provide as smooth a transition as possible for the
private ECU market. 7 It also wants to avoid damaging business trans-
actions done in private ECUs. 7 ' As a result, the Community has done a
number of things to minimize the effect of any redefinition of the official
ECU on the private ECU. 1 7 2 First, the rules governing the alteration of
the official ECU composition are designed to promote the stability of the
official ECU and optimize its allure as a currency. 173 By stabilizing the
alteration of the official ECU, a smoother transition for the private ECU
is ensured. Specifically, there are four provisions in the EMS Resolution
that accomplish these goals. First, weights of component currencies are
examined every five years or on request if the currency has changed over
25% in value.1 74 Second, weights of component currencies should be set
in line with economic criteria. 175 Third, revisions of the ECU basket
cannot alter the external value of the ECU on the date the change be-
comes effective. 176 Finally, revision of the ECU basket must be approved
by a unanimous vote by the European Council. 177
Upon the introduction of the Greek drachma into the basket, the
Community noted that the Greek authorities had taken the proper steps
to ensure that the introduction would not affect the use of the private
ECU. 178 Given the EEC's past efforts to ensure that any change in the
official ECU would be accompanied by a smooth transition for private
ECU holders, any move to use the ECU as a single currency should try
to continue such efforts.
V. THE NEXT STAGE IN MONETARY UNION
In December 1990, the EEC held an intergovernmental conference
to revise the existing Treaty of Rome and to establish the necessary insti-
tutions to proceed with monetary union.1 79 There are currently two
main proposals concerning this revision. The first is embodied in the
169 Levich, supra note 25, at 21-22.
170 Id. at 21.
171 Id. at 22.
172 Id. at 21.
173 Id.
174 THE ECU, supra note 2, at A2.3.
175 Levich, supra note 25, at 21.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 J.V. Louis, supra note 36, at 31.
179 Delors Losing Grip on ECU Debate, The Independent, Dec. 17, 1990, at 9.
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Delors Report,180 and the second is Great Britain's "hard ECU"
alternative.18"
A. The Delors Report
The Delors Report proposes to take decisive steps towards monetary
union. It foresees free circulation of capital and integrated financial mar-
kets among the EEC countries. 8 2 In order to achieve this goal, member
states' economic and monetary policies need to be more closely coordi-
nated; this includes, but is not limited to, convergent inflation and unem-
ployment rates and similar budgetary and competition polices. This
would result in increased economic interdependence among member
countries as well as a decrease in independent monetary policies.
The Delors Report points out the need for a new treaty to realize the
EMU provisions in the SEA.8 3 It also proposes that such a treaty
should lay down the "basic functional and institutional arrangements, as
well as [the] provisions governing their step-by-step implementation."'
' 8 4
In addition, the Report provides the alternative for new treaties at each
stage of monetary union.18 5 While such an option is positive because it
would "reaffirm the political consensus at each stage," ' 6 it would also be
a slow and possibly counter-productive process. 187
Although the Delors Report envisions some degree of national au-
tonomy among the member states, this is not a top priority of the report.
Instead, it would allow for a transfer of power from member states to
EEC institutions if this power would be beneficial to further development
of European monetary union.' 88 Consequently, the Delors Report does
not rule out a United States of Europe. Once again, the Delors Report
remains consistent with the tradition of political will driving further de-
velopment by noting that any emphasis on maintaining the independence
of each member state is a reflection of the current political and economic
developments within the Community.
189
The Delors Report, in setting out to execute monetary union for the
EEC, describes three principle features of monetary union:
180 See generally Delors Report, supra note 5.
181 See generally Evolutionary Approach, supra note 8.
182 Louis, A Monetary Union for Tomorrow, 26 COMMON MKT. L. R. 301, 303 (1989).
183 Delors Report, supra note 5, at 13 § 18.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 37.
186 Id.
187 Louis, supra note 182, at 306.
188 Id. at 305.
189 Id.
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1) Irreversible conversion of exchange rates,
19°
2) Liberalization of capital transactions and integration of banking and
other financial markets, and1 91
3) Elimination of margins of fluctuations and irrevocable locking of ex-
change rate parities.
192
According to the Delors Report, the first of these two features are
almost realized or will be attained once the internal market program is
complete. 193 The discussion has been over the third feature, and the
Delors Report sees a system of irrevocably fixed exchange rates as, "[t]he
single most important condition for monetary union." 194 Soon after
these rates are fixed, the European System of Central Banks 195 would
issue the ECU as the EEC's currency. The Delors Report prefers a sin-
gle currency because it facilitates the monetary management of the Com-
munity, removes intra-Community exchange rate uncertainties, and
avoids the transaction costs involved in converting multiple curren-
cies. 196 Moreover, a single European currency eliminates exchange rate
variability and reduces the Community's susceptibility to external shocks
from non-EEC countries. 197
At this point, it seems the Delors Report begins to ignore the "polit-
ical will" doctrine. The Report never states that a switch to fixed ex-
change rates, and subsequently to a single currency, should be a
reflection of the current political and economic developments within the
Community. The Delors Report also proves to be a little over-enthusias-
tic about achieving monetary union. The Delors Report suggests that
locking exchange rates is the first step in achieving monetary union.198
Once this occurs, Community countries' interest rates would tend to con-
verge when, "[h]ouseholds, labor unions, and other economic agents
were convinced that the decision to lock exchange rates would not be
reversed." 199 The Delors Report then attempts to fulfill other optimum
currency area requirements by noting that, "[b]oth coherent monetary
management and convincing evidence of an effective coordination of
non-monetary policies would be crucial" for a monetary union.20°
190 Delors Report, supra note 5, at 14 § 22.
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The problem is that the Delors Report expects the requirements of
an optimum currency area to be met after fixed exchange rates are en-
forced. This is completely contrary to the economics of optimum cur-
rency areas.20 1 Simply imposing fixed exchange rates on an area could
court disaster.202
In addition, only having one currency implies that member coun-
tries can no longer use their exchange rate adjustments to correct imbal-
ances in their own economic policies. These imbalances have certainly
occurred in the past. For example, German prospects for economic
growth in post-cold war Eastern Europe have driven up the value of the
deutschmark. This increase in the value of the deutschmark was suffi-
cient to require the Italian government to undertake an emergency deval-
uation of the lira in January 1990.203
It is possible that the removal of barriers to trade and factor mobil-
ity will affect different regions of the EEC at different times, and result in
some countries needing to devalue their currency.204 While the Delors
Report does acknowledge this problem, it advocates the parallel advance-
ment in economic and monetary integration,20 5 noting, however, that
such parallel advancement is not always possible.20 6 An attempt at par-
allel advancement might result in the exporting and importing of other
member countries' inflation and/or unemployment,207 demonstrating the
Delors Report's rigid and often unrealistic approach.
The Report also explicitly rejects issuing the ECU in addition to the
existing Community currencies and allowing them to compete.20 8 The
Delors Report views this so-called parallel currency strategy as inflation-
ary.209 Furthermore, the Report proposes that a parallel issuance of the
ECU will complicate the already difficult process of coordinating mem-
bers' monetary policies because there will be an additional monetary pol-
icy, that of the ECU, to coordinate.210 In addition, the Report barely
201 See supra notes 94-132 and accompanying text.
202 Id.
203 Templeman, German Unity: A Threat to Europe 1992?, BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 22, 1990.
204 Delors Report, supra note 5, at 28 § 42.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 See supra notes 94-132 and accompanying text.
208 Delors Report, supra note 5, at 29 § 47.
209 Id. An issuance of a parallel currency in addition to the existing national currency would
result in an increased money supply, though in different currencies, while the same amount of goods
would still be produced for that country. This would result in too much money chasing too few
goods, which is the classic inflation scenario. See R. DORNSBUSCH & S. FISCHER,
MACROECONOMICS 450 (1984).
210 Delors Report, supra note 5, at 29 § 42.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 12:390(1991)
discusses the repercussions that a move to a common currency may have
on the private ECU. Rather, it believes that a transformation of the bas-
ket ECU into a true currency would not reduce the attraction of the
basket ECU for private investors.211
Finally, Section 31 of the Delors Report states, "[e]conomic and
monetary union would require the creation of a new monetary institu-
tion, placed in the constellation of Community institutions. ' 21 2 This
gives rise to the creation of a European System of Central Banks, which
would be an autonomous institution and would be somewhat analogous
to the U.S. Federal Reserve System.213
The Delors Report proposes a three stage progression to monetary
union in the EEC.214 The deadline for each stage should remain flexible
because the legislature cannot remedy the economic situations which
may delay the movement to another stage.215 Furthermore, certain
countries may take longer to join the EMU than others due to economic
and political considerations.216
The first stage of monetary union is essentially where the EEC is at
now. During this stage, the Community should take decisive steps to-
ward monetary union by aiming toward economic convergence.217 All
obstacles to financial integration should be removed, and one financial
area should exist where all monetary and financial instruments revolve
liberally.218 All Community currencies would participate in the ERM,
and exchange rate realignment would still occur but with countries rely-
ing more heavily on other adjustment mechanisms.219 All obstacles to
the use of the private ECU should be removed.220 The transition to Stage
Two would be signaled by the preparation and ratification of a change to
the Treaty of Rome.221
Stage Two would begin the with the ratification of such an amend-
ment, and would call for setting up new Community institutions and re-
vising old ones. This would effect a transfer of power from member
countries to the EEC regarding macroeconomic policies and certain deci-
211 Louis, supra note 182, at 317.
212 Delors Report, supra note 5, at 21 § 31.
213 Louis, supra note 182, at 311.
214 See generally Delors Report, supra note 5.
215 Id. The EC is currently at Stage One. Stage Two is set for January 1, 1994. Adding Up the
Costs of the EMS, Sunday Times (London), Dec. 16, 1990.
216 Louis, supra note 182, at 316.
217 Delors Report, supra note 5, at 30 § 50.
218 Id. at 31 § 52.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 30 § 50.
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sion-making processes.2 22 One of these institutions would be the Euro-
pean System of Central Banks (ESCB).2 23 The crucial function of the
ESCB would be the "transition from independent national monetary pol-
icies... to the formulation and implementation of a common monetary
policy."224 Exchange reserves would be pooled to use in exchange rate
intervention, exchange rate realignments would become less frequent,
and fluctuations within the ERM would decrease.2 25
The third stage of monetary union would begin with a shift to irrev-
ocably locked exchange rates, and a shift to Community powers in the
macroeconomic and budgetary areas.2 26 Finally, the next logical step
would be to move to a single currency.
B. Great Britain's Evolutionary Approach
While the Delors Report was certainly the leading proposal prior to
the December 1990 conference, many countries have problems with its
strategies and have suggested alternative proposals. 227 Great Britain is
one country to put forth an alternative proposal. It is interesting to note
that of all the member countries, Great Britain, especially during the
Thatcher government, has been the most resistant to European monetary
union. There is some question as to whether Britain's plan is a genuine
alternative or merely a way of stalling monetary union.228 However,
Britain's recent membership in the ERM, and the internal strife between
Thatcher and the Liberal Democratic members of Parliament that led to
her demise,2 29 cast doubt on this speculation. In addition, the recent rise
to power of Prime Minister John Major (who helped write the British
alternative while Thatcher was still Prime Minister) indicates that the
British may be sincere about their proposal.2 3 °
222 Id. at 33 § 55.
223 Id. at 34 § 57.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 34-35 § 57.
226 Id. at 35 § 58.
227 Britain No Longer Sole EC Skeptic, Daily Telegraph, Dec. 19, 1990, at 12.
228 See Tories Seek to Head Off Split on Monetary Union, Financial Times, Oct. 23, 1990, at 14.
("If the 'hard ECU' plan is to have a slim chance of success, Britain's European partners must be
persuaded that it is more than a diversionary tactic.")
229 Id. See also Liberal Democrats Eager for a Place in the EMU Fast Lane, Financial Times,
Oct. 23, 1990, at 14.
230 Same Song, Softer Voice on European Currency, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1990. Major is
staunchly against a single European currency. However, the Community views him as calmer and
more reasonable on the subject than Mrs. Thatcher. He also seems more willing to bargain and
listen to other alternatives. Id.
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1. Background to the Proposal
Prior to this proposal, Great Britain's Treasury proposed a number
of fundamental principles for economic and monetary integration.2 31
These recommendations included: 1) a desire to enlarge the leverage of
markets and competition;232 2) respect for the principle of subsidiarity;
233
and 3) a strengthening of the forces that stabilize prices.
2 4
The Treasury felt that stable prices could be achieved through mar-
ket competition within the EEC single market, while maintaining deci-
sions about national monetary policy at a national level.235 This is in
contrast to the Delors Report which purports that monetary decisions
should be made at a Community level. Consequently, the Treasury did
not think that any revision of the EEC Treaty was necessary because no
new Community institutions would be needed under its proposals.
236
2. The Proposal
However, other member countries did not think that these Treasury
alternatives went far enough.2 37 Thus, Great Britain needed a new alter-
native proposal. The current proposal from the British Invisible Export
Council attempts to combine the Treasury suggestions with Stage Two of
the Delors Report.23 8 It also addresses Section 57 of the Delors Report,
which advocates the transfer of decision-making power from national au-
thorities, who have all the power in Stage 2, to Community institutions,
which have all the power in Stage 3.239
The British approach suggests the formation of an alternative Com-
munity institution called the European Monetary Fund (EMF) as part of
the ESCB in Stage 2.2 o The EMF would allow the central banks to
remain accountable at a national level. Further, it would allow central
banks to compete within the infrastructure of the single market and the
EMS, with the objective of keeping inflation low, while also ensuring the
convergence of their respective monetary polices.24 1 The EMF would
also be in charge of either fixing exchange rates (although not irrevoca-
231 Evolutionary Approach, supra note 8, at 2.
232 Id.
233 Id The notion of subsidiarity states that the EEC will not undertake any policies which the
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bly), or allowing rates to float within a narrow margin.2 4 2
Furthermore, the EMF would also ensure that interest rate differ-
ences between member currencies would be reduced.243 The EMF would
be owned by the respective national banks, and these banks would pro-
vide the necessary capital to insure the EMF's operation.2' The EMF
would have three key purposes: 1) setting a "European Standard"' for
EEC exchange rates to reflect "the best" in the Community rather than
"the average";"' 2) issuing the ECU as a dual currency;246 and 3) assum-
ing the administration of the EMS and ERM.24 7
The most interesting of these goals for the purposes of this article is
the issuance of the ECU as a dual currency. Under this system, individu-
als and business consumers would have the choice of transacting their
business in national currencies or ECUs.2 48 ECUs would be issued on
demand by consumers, and the currencies would be convertible to the
ECU on the proposed European Standard.249 This would result in a
competition between national currencies and the ECU, with the strongest
one emerging as the single currency.250 Thus, this Community policy
would result in a currency that would be stronger than member state
national currencies, and the Community would not be performing a pol-
icy that member countries could do more efficiently on their own.251
Initially, national currencies would most likely be used in national
transactions.25 2 The ECU would be used more and more in transactions
between particular member states and the rest of the EEC.253 Consum-
ers could switch back and forth from ECUs to national currencies on
demand.254 Eventually, this would lead to a decline in exchange rate un-
certainty, and a decline in transaction costs involved in changing curren-
cies.255 This would occur because, "[t]he objective would be that any
exchange risk arising from the EMF's operations in ECUs would be
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rency was converted into ECUs, rather than by all member countries in
proportion to their central banks' shareholdings in the EMF." '256 The
ECU would emerge as the common currency of the EEC when a sub-
stantial amount of national currencies had been traded in for ECUs.25 7
This proposal is very different from the Delors Report proposal of
irreversibly issuing the ECU in substitution for national currencies once
exchange rates are fixed. Under the U.K. approach, any transfer of
power to Community institutions coincides with demand for the ECU
among businesses and individual consumers.258 Thus, a move to mone-
tary union occurs only when market preferences of individual and busi-
ness consumers in the Community favor ECUs in substitution for their
national currencies. 59 Unlike the Delors Report, this approach seems
more consistent with the political will that has been driving develop-
ments toward monetary union since the inception of the EMS.2"
The British alternative also sets up a "European Standard" for the
ECU. Under this standard, the common monetary policy of the EEC
would be based on ECUs rather than gold.261 In order to achieve this,
exchange rates among Community countries would need to be either
fixed (though not irrevocably) in terms of the ECU or allowed to fluctu-
ate within very narrow margins.262 This enables the ECU to become a
fixed monetary standard like gold. National central banks would possess
separate responsibilities for monetary policies of their own currency, and
would take collective responsibility for issuing the ECU.263 In both
cases, this would be done through the Council of the EMF which is made
up of the Committee of Central Bank Governors. 2" This allows member
countries to maintain some degree of independence in their monetary
policies, and takes into account the fact that member countries still have
very different economies and need to implement different policies within
their economic sectors.265 Yet, it still allows for political and economic
will to dictate the emergence of the ECU, which is consistent with past
approaches towards EMU.
266
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The British alternative also calls for a redefinition of the ECU.2 67
Currently, the ECU is defined as a basket currency representing fixed
weights of the member currencies. This proportion is revised every five
years and currencies of new member countries are incorporated into the
ECU value at that time. Consequently, the ECU represents an "aver-
*26age" of its component currencies. 268 Under the British proposal, the
ECU should represent the "best" currency rather than the "average".
This means that the ECU's exchange rate needs to be as strong as the
EEC's strongest currency in terms of third currencies like the dollar or
the yen.269
The EMF can achieve this by managing the ECU independently of
other Community currencies.270 It would be necessary for member cur-
rencies to be managed by fixing their exchange rates in terms of the ECU
and allowing either narrow or no margins of fluctuations.27 1 As a result,
the ECU would appreciate or depreciate within these narrow margins;
once exchange rates were fixed, the ECU could never depreciate in terms
of the currency of another country.27 2 In addition, the rate of return on
the ECU would depend on the interest differential between the ECU and
the national currencies as well as exchange rate changes.273 In the long
run, the return on the ECU would be no higher than the rate of return on
national currencies.2 74
3. Criticism of the British Proposal
This aspect of the British proposal, known as the "hard ECU" pro-
posal, has received varied responses across Europe. z75 It has won backing
from the Bank of France Governor Jacques De Larosier.27 6 Spain, while
supportive, fears that a hard ECU may have recessionary effects on
poorer countries.277 Germany, however, opposes the hard ECU and in-
stead suggests a gradual hardening of the ECU.2 78 According to Ger-
many's proposal, the value of the strongest currencies in the basket
267 Evolutionary Approach, supra note 8, at 6.
268 Id. at 5.
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would be increased at every new realignment of the ECU.2 79 The ECU
would gradually harden as the weight of the those strong currencies in-
creased.2"' This proposal is consistent with Germany's past pushes for
the deutschmark to be adopted as Europe's currency."" While the pro-
posal does fit the British aim of creating the "best" ECU, it only works as
long as the deutschmark and the other strong currencies making up the
ECU are themselves strong.2"2 If any of these currencies should fall, the
ECU would fall in value as well.283 It is possible that German reunifica-
tion will weaken the deutschmark and consequently weaken the ECU.2 4
Spain has recently submitted a proposal, based on the British propo-
sal, that suggests a hardening of the existing ECU basket rather than the
creation of a new ECU.2 85 The hardening would occur when there was
an EMS realignment.286 During these realignments, the value of the
weaker currencies that make up the basket ECU would be increased.
28 7
This would prevent the ECU from losing value against those currencies
not devalued.2"8 The Spanish plan also eliminates another key feature of
the British plan: the hard ECU-issuing bank would not exert pressure on
lax national treasuries.28 9 Others suggest hardening the existing ECU by
freezing the existing currency amounts that make up the ECU basket.
At the start of Stage Two in 1994, member countries would avoid future
realignments.290 Both proposals would help attain the British goal of low
inflation by stabilizing prices.29 1 In addition, they suggest that there
would be no confusion over the type of ECU in circulation, yet the
amount of ECUs in circulation would still be decided by market forces
and not the government.292
While it is easy to see how continuing with the old ECU would elim-
inate the confusion incurred by a switch to a new ECU, it may not meet
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the British goal of the ECU being the "best". Rather, it would still be an
average of its component currencies, and thus unable to compete with
the dollar and the yen because it would not be as strong as the strongest
currency in the basket. While the Spanish plan addresses this problem
by revaluing the currency when EMS realignments occur, Spain's version
of the hard ECU would still represent an average. Additionally, adjust-
ing the ECU may sustain its foreign exchange value, but it would intro-
duce uncertainties on the ECU interest rate.293
Moreover, switching to a completely new ECU has some advan-
tages. A basket currency's exchange rates and interest rates must remain
close to the sum of its component currencies.294 Currently, the propor-
tion of the ECU money supply to member currencies is very low, and the
ECU's exchange and interest rates are manageable.295 However, if the
ECU supply increases greatly (which is one of the goals of Stage Two), it
becomes more and more difficult to manage the ECU's exchange and
interest rates.29 6 Consequently, it is important that a new institution
control the development of a new ECU. This institution would control
the ECU's interest and exchange rates, and consequently its money sup-
ply, by issuing the ECU in substitution of national currencies.2 9 7
Furthermore, the British proposal should be preferred because it ad-
dresses the effect of the ECU redefinition on the private ECU more fully
than the Delors Report. As mentioned earlier, the ECU is an "open bas-
ket" that reflects the official definition of the ECU at the moment and
creates some risk for those using the ECU to hedge underlying positions
in component currencies. 29 8 Realignments of the official ECU could
have a serious impact on the private market ECU, and consequently the
EEC has tried to minimize potential damages that realignments could
cause in the private market.299 Obviously, a complete redefinition of the
ECU would have serious repercussions on the private market.
Despite criticism that the British plan would involve "discontinu-
ity" with the private ECU market,"° the British proposal tries to remain
consistent with the EEC's approach. It recognizes that there needs to be
continuity at the point of exchange between the external value of the
newly defined ECU and the old ECU. This reassures those in the private
293 EMU Train, supra note 285.
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market with contracts (written in ECUs) that are due to mature after the
redefinition.3°' While this continuity has occurred with previous revi-
sions of the ECU, the difference with this change would be that "the
ECU exchange rate and the ECU interest rate would not be determined
by a new mix of component currencies." 302 Rather, there would be a
new ECU that was no longer comprised of a basket of currencies. To
achieve continuity for this revision, interest rates would need to be set by
the EMF with the goal of low inflation, and the external value of the
ECU "would be enforced by changes in interest rates and exchange inter-
vention in ECUs against third currencies (e.g. the dollar). 30 3 This Brit-
ish approach to the problem is more consistent with the Community's
past efforts to maintain continuity during ECU revisions than the Delors
Report, which barely addresses the problem.
The British proposal has been subject to some criticism. First of all,
proponents of the Delors Report oppose any simultaneous issue of the
ECU with national currencies because they fear it will cause inflation.3"
This is a valid fear if the ECU were issued as a parallel currency because
there would be additional money in circulation, but no additional goods.
This would create the classic inflationary scenario of too much money
chasing too few goods. However, the British proposal seeks to have the
ECU issued in substitution for national currencies as market forces re-
quire.3°5 As a result, the same amount of purchasing power will remain
in the market, and no inflationary pressure will occur.30 6 In addition,
part of the EMF's responsibilities would be to control the supply of
ECUs and reduce inflation.30 7
The Delors Report also criticizes parallel currency suggestions be-
cause such a system would complicate the task of coordinating national
monetary policies.308 This is not applicable to the British proposal be-
cause whatever the mix of ECU and national currencies, it is always clear
which entity (either national or Community) is responsible for monetary
decisions.30 9 In addition, it is easier for member countries to accept the
coordination of their national monetary policies when there is not a
301 Evolutionary Approach, supra note 8, at 6. Any change in the definition of the official ECU
will have an undeniable effect on the private ECU.
302 Id. at 6-7.
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transfer of control from the national to the Community level.31° Thus,
neither of these criticisms are applicable to the British proposal of the
ECU as a dual currency.
However, under both the British proposal and the Delors Report,
the ECU would be subject to outside speculation.311 The British propo-
sal suggests that in this event, the EMF should intervene against the yen
or the dollar with ECUs, and the national central banks should intervene
with their own currency.3 12 This would have the effect of sterilizing the
net monetary effects a speculation might have on the ECU.313
The EMF would have monetary control over the ECU. 31g This con-
trol would be similar to a central bank's control over its national cur-
rency. The EMF would influence ECU interest rates through open
market operations in ECUs. The EMF would reinforce the Community
policy of low inflation by buying and selling ECUs to keep the interest
rate lOW. 315 The EMF would also be the lender of last resort.316 The
idea is to let the market set the interest level for ECUs based on its redefi-
nition as the strongest currency.3 17 As a strong currency the ECU would
be attractive to investors, while the low interest rates would attract bor-
rowers as well.3 18 In addition, by setting a low interest rate for the
ECU, the EMF would cause national monetary policies to follow suit
because residents would purchase ECUs due to their lower interest
rates.3 19 Eventually this would lead to more control over national mone-
tary policies once the ECU substantially substitutes for the national
320currencies.
The EMF would also be responsible for intervention between the
ECU and third currencies.32 1 The EMF would issue ECU securities for
dollars, or sell dollars and purchase ECU securities where circumstances
demanded. Any exchange risk arising from the EMF's operations in
ECUs would be borne by each member country in proportion to the
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countries in proportion to their Central Bank's share in the EMF.32 2
Unlike the Delors Report, the British proposal's Stage Two is a set
of significant monetary arrangements in its own right. The transition to
Stage Three will occur depending on how long it takes for the ECU to be
accepted. Perhaps at some specific proportion, 80% for example, there
would be an irrevocable switch to the ECU as the common currency.3 23
4. Recent Developments
The December 1990 intergovernmental conference of the European
Community proved to be very beneficial for the British alternative.3 24
The Delors Report lost backing while Great Britain's proposal gained
support from Spain, France, and Italy.3 25 One reason the Delors Report
lost support at the conference was because it was very unclear on the
implementation of its proposals. 326 Member countries are also aware of
the divergence in their respective economies.3 2 7 Countries with weaker
economies fear that the fixed exchange rates of Delors' Second Stage
could prove to be too tight of a monetary discipline for them, while coun-
tries with stronger economies fear that countries with weaker economies
will press for inflationary policies.32 8 This is consistent with the theory
of optimum currency areas, which, as stated earlier, discourages fixed
exchange rates among countries with divergent economies.3 29 Thus, the
British alternative, which incorporates both monetary discipline and
gradualism, gained support and was seriously considered as a plausible
alternative to the Delors Report.330
In Germany, where the Government foresees Stage Two of the Eu-
ropean Monetary Union starting in 1994, Bundesbank President Karl
Otto Poehl has spoken out against the establishment of the ECU as a
thirteenth currency, and specifically against the British proposal of estab-
lishing the ECU as a parallel currency.33 1 Poehl sees no advantage to the
British alternative over the Delors Report.3 32 Indeed, he thinks that the
322 Id. at 10.
323 Id. at 18.
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hard ECU and the creation of the EMF could create an "indeterminate
area of monetary policy." 3 ' He recently argued that choosing to use the
ECU as the currency for Community monetary policy operations would
cause the EEC to orient itself toward the Community's average inflation
rates.334 Germany is against this since its inflation rate is below the Com-
munity's average. The Dutch have echoed these concerns. 335 However,
Poehl also noted that the British proposal contains some good points,
and agreed that the value of the ECU needs to be strengthened.336 In-
deed, Germany has drafted its own alternative to the Delors Report
which shows some softening of Germany's original hard line position.337
Prime Minister Major and Chancellor Kohl have recently agreed that
"both sides will work to help each other along and avoid direct confron-
tation" despite their differences.338
Italy has also written a paper giving some support to the British
proposal with respect to the strengthening of the ECU. The paper ex-
plicitly calls for the EEC not to reject the British proposal.339 Further-
more, Spanish Finance Minister Carlos Solchaga Catalan has stated that
the British proposal would be "useful as 'practice' runs towards a single
currency and a central European bank. '340 Danish Prime Minister Poul
Schliiter has also recently advocated the use of parallel currencies.341
A recent report from the European Commission points out that the
smaller EEC countries like Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, Denmark,
and the Netherlands stand to gain the most from replacing their curren-
cies with the ECU because the ECU would be used far more widely in
international payments than their national currency.342 Moreover, the
report acknowledges that at this time, "the EC is ill-suited as a geo-
graphic unit to have a single money because labor in not mobile enough
within it." '43 This is consistent with optimal currency areas theory.
Since December 1990, there have been recurring intergovernmental
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conferences. Great Britain submitted an amendment consistent with its
proposals for the EMF and the hard ECU.3 " Jacques Delors also
presented a proposal consistent with his Report, a4 5 while Spain and
France have submitted their own proposals.3
Most recently, though, the British alternative seems to have lost
some of its ground. Many believe that the other eleven members of the
European Community do not take the hard ECU seriously.347 However,
there are signs that the British government still backs its proposal.
34 8
Prime Minister Major has signaled that his hard ECU proposal could be
subsumed in other EC government proposals.349 There are some indica-
tions that Great Britain is willing to amend substantial parts of its propo-
sal if the other member countries are willing to accept its idea of a
thirteenth currency as a route to monetary union.350 Great Britain has
already accepted that earlier plans for a European central bank could fill
the shoes of its proposed EMF,351 and that such an authority could be
independent of national political control. 35 2 Finally, Prime Minister Ma-
jor has even gone as far to say that there would need to be a political
decision, most likely preceded by an election, to convert the ECU into a
single currency.35 3
There is some indication the Great Britain may be willing to accept
the Spanish alternative.354 This proposal calls for a "hard basket"
ECU.3 55 Parts of this plan are also supported by Germany.35 6 The main
thrust of the proposal is to disallow any devaluations of the ECU against
EMS currencies starting in 1994.35" The basket would still be composed
of the twelve national currencies.3 58 When the EMS realigns its curren-
cies, the amount of each national currency in the basket "would be ad-
justed to preserve a basket composed of some of each of the twelve
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national currencies." '359 While this could transform the ECU into a
strong currency, the occasional changes in the composition of the basket
would still disturb the private ECU market.36
The EC Commission has put forth an alternative proposal to freeze
the ECU basket.361 This proposal has received French support, and sug-
gests irrevocably freezing the level of national currencies that make up
the basket at the currencies' current levels.362 This would be better
for the private ECU market, but there is no guarantee that the twelve
composite currencies would naturally converge toward the best perform-
ance and guarantee the ECU's value against the strongest national
currency.36 3
VI. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the EEC should move to a common currency, but there is
no reason to rush towards such a dramatic change. According to optimal
currency area theory, the current system of limited flexibility within the
EEC is ideal. Any move to a common currency should be flexible in that
it initially allows member states the ability to use national monetary pol-
icy if necessary. The British proposal allows just this kind of flexibility.
Moreover, the history of progress toward monetary union shows a
reliance on political will. The EMS was originally a mere resolution that
worked because of prevailing political and economic will. The Single Eu-
ropean Act was left vague specifically to allow for such will. The Delors
Report, however, does not seem to reflect this feeling. Rather, it pro-
poses a regimented change to a single currency. In contrast, the British
proposal recognizes this need for political will by allowing national cur-
rencies to be exchanged on demand for ECUs. Given Germany's recent
reunification, and the problems in the Persian Gulf, this is a time when
flexibility in economic and monetary policies is high in demand, and con-
sequently, the British proposal is the better option for any amendment to
the Treaty of Rome.
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